In Chapter 3 (A Creative Illusion), Lewis-Williams brings up a great point that a person involved in anthropological, sociological, psychological, etcetera studies has to be very wary of “the danger of predetermining a particular kind of answer (that was in all probability in mind from the beginning)” (Lewis-Williams 73). Specifically, Laming-Emperaire and Leroi-Gourhan are referenced due to the fact that their hypotheses were derived from the way they collected their data and managed it. Linearity, Lewis-Williams explains, cannot be the sole method used when observing and analyzing data. I believe it’s fair to say that this statement (in the context of Lewis-Williams’ text) was made because of how complex and unusual human behavior, evolution, and mere existence is. In science as well as the humanities, if a particular hypothesis is stated, there is some logical reasoning behind it (which is why a hypothesis is described as an “educated guess”). Therefore, it is hard to withhold bias(es) that might be in one’s mind. After all, it’s simple human nature to be opinionated and to have feelings. It is hard to detach oneself from personal beliefs and prior knowledge of a topic, but it is necessary to alter one’s perspective when looking at different people’s, especially when looking at those from the past and those of a different species.
On page 104 Lewis-Williams says “…consciousness (as distinct from brain)…” This sentence made me think of homunculi. Although Lewis-Williams (rightly, I believe) wants to address the concept of consciousness as fundamentally biological, he still implicitly uses this notion of the inner person as distinct from the biological person. When we consider Lewis-Williams’ concept of ‘consciousness’ in this way, shamanistic imagery is consciousness projecting biological images into the physical world. In other words, first the images are created neurologically while a person is experiencing an altered state. In Gellian terms, the hallucinations are the ‘prototype’. This prototype agent then affects the ‘higher order consciousness’ of the person who is experiencing the hallucination, and he or she remembers the experience and depicts it in art form. Thus we have Neurological images (Prototype; primary agent) -> Higher order consciousness (Artist; secondary agent) -> Cave paintings/statuettes (Index; both types of agent) I called the paintings both primary and secondary agents. Lewis-Williams would argue that they offer insights into the cosmology of the people who created them. He would also argue, based on the way people utilize the cave wall or the pieces of ivory, that they are ‘real’ spirits, which influence the world and cosmology of the artists. In that way, the paintings ARE agents, and there should be arrows traveling from ‘cave paintings’ back up to ‘higher order consciousness’. There should also be an arrow up to ‘Images’, since, cosmologically, ‘neurological images’ ARE the spirit world (and thus they are primary agents). Biologically, drawing visions is a self-reinforcing process as the brain would continue to create images with which it is familiar – presumably similar to those a person sees and draws on cave walls (and thus they are also secondary agents). In Gellian terms, then, the process Lewis-Williams describes continuously reinforces itself in a social web of agency between the spirit world and the human world. I suspect that the patient in this relationship is the populace as a whole. The images (as secondary agents) influence the population as patients and maintain the Shaman’s power. If we wanted to draw more arrows, we could have the population (receiver p) influencing the shamans (receiver p; by shamans I mean their physical bodies). The shamans’ physical condition could also be said to influence the neurological images, so we need a line from shaman (receiver p) to neurological images (prototype a). Anyway, I hope that makes sense. And I hope it was appropriate to bring in and older text to analyze a piece of our current one.
(Sarah E) In the argument proposed by Lewis-WIlliams that Homo sapiens had a higher level of consciousness and therefore could practice shamanism and remember dreams and socialize with others while discussing these dreams, he also claims that Neanderthals did not have this same level of consciousness and therefore did not have the capabilities to practice shamanism or experience and altered state. This seems like a definitely plausible argument and one that accounts for the cave art, but in bringing up this argument, I can't help but wonder why the human brain would have evolved to include the capabilities of altered states of consciousness, whether these are dreams or drug-induced states. Lewis-Williams makes a strong connection between Neanderthals and other animals as far as brain functions in regards to dreams, but would Neanderthals therefore not be affected by drugs that induce altered states of consciousness? Also, what is the evolutionary advantage of being able to dream and have a higher level of consciousness? Doesn't this also lead to a lot more possible brain diseases and dysfunctions (like schizophrenia and others)?
I find Lewis-Williams’ neuropsychological model explaining the sudden explosion of Upper Paleolithic art to be intriguing and brave. Lewis-Williams critiques Mithen’s theory of modular domains of intelligence, claiming that the theory relies on observation of modern animal and human behavior and that we cannot study the “modularity of ancient minds” (111). By my reading Lewis-Williams does the exact same thing in his study of primary and higher-order consciousness.
He acknowledges the difficulty of studying consciousness, and while he lays out “explicit neural models” as Edelman insists one must (186), through his neuropsychological model its seems that he is unable to reconcile the existence of anatomically and behaviorally modern humans in Africa with the scarcity of image-making prior to the upper Paleolithic.
I like the hypothesis that the existence of shamanism and altered states of mind is responsible for the sudden appearance of representational images but Lewis-Williams acknowledges that the shift to behavioral modernity seems to have begun in Africa 250,000-300,000 years ago (98). I am confused how he can thus agree that there was no “revolution” and that modern behaviors developed differently in different places yet support his whole argument for the explosion of art in western Europe with a universal neuropsychological model of anatomically modern humans. If anatomically modern humans in Africa showed some modern behavioral characteristics what changed in Europe? Maybe I am missing his point but it seems that he circularly explains the explosion of image-making by stating that they had higher-level consciousness but proves their higher-level consciousness by pointing to the explosion of image-making. I think one of the greatest difficulties of taking on this study is the European bias that exists the field.
I enjoyed following Lewis-William's argument about higher and altered consciousness being the cause of the explosion of art in the Upper Paleolithic period. I was skeptical at first when he pointed to altered states of mind being the explanation of the creation of images. I thought that this kind of consciousness must happen only under very specific circumstances, and that it in no way could have led to the vast amounts of images that were created and that still are created today. I asked myself how often could these Upper Paleolithic homo sapiens be inducing hallucinations and visions? As Lewis-Williams continued to discuss his ideas about shamanism and the evidence of interaction with the caves, however, I became convinced that he has a great deal of reason in his argument. He brings up evidence that I never would have connected to an alternate reality, such as floating bison, and handprints becoming part of the cave wall. I think my favorite part of his argument was that this Transition was entirely biological. I find it somewhat ironic that he wishes to take a biological approach to the world of spirits and religion which are in a way the opposite of biology.
Lewis-Williams’ argument about hallucination and shamans gave me a new point of view to understand cave art. His hypothesis is quite plausible in that the images in the cave might come with the ability to project the evanescent images onto the walls. He assumes that not all people possess such abilities, so only shamans might be allowed to go into the cave and perform socially discriminating activities. However, is the image-making related only to the hallucination? I agree with Sarah in that hallucination may not be a proof of evolution in consciousness, but I assume that image-making may not require the hallucination itself. In his argument, image-making is the production of Homo sapiens, not of Neanderthals. If the consciousness of Homo sapiens is developed enough to draw an image, why is hallucination needed to make such images? We know that even toddlers can draw pictures of animals, and do they draw them in the phase of hallucination or after waking up from a dream? I think Homo sapiens might make the images just to mimic the shapes of what they saw, like babies do. Therefore, there might not be any social discrimination in image-making among Homo sapiens because all of them had the ability to make one. However, Neanderthals are different. They did not possess the same level of consciousness as Homo sapiens, thus only some special people, such as shamans, could be involved in image-making. Isn’t there any possibility that such a shaman was someone from Homo sapiens who was neighbor of Neanderthals?
I find this book to be very interesting, but I seem to have a couple of issues with some of the points brought up by Lewis-Williams. There could be a chance I misunderstood the point he was trying to make, but it seemed like to me that he was saying that one of the main reasons Neanderthals weren't able to survive was the fact that they didn't create any sort of images. He states that, "Neanderthals were unable to remember and entertain mental imagery...manipulate and share that imagery...recognize a connection between mental images and two- and three dimensional images" (93). He believes that to be able to construct images, one needs to have an advanced brain; in regards to the Neanderthals they didn't have this. He says that with their mental capacity they were only able to construct tools that possible reflected their social status. Lewis-Williams does bring up interesting points, but from what I remember learning about Neanderthals, one of the main reasons they became extinct was the fact they were out competed by other Homo sapiens (Cro-Mongons). Furthermore, he makes it sound like the only thing Neanderthals knew what to do is make tools and that they had no language. Even though Neanderthals had a somewhat smaller cranial capacity to that of Homo sapiens, couldn't it be possible they had some sort of language that wasn't spoken. I may be getting carried away here, but maybe could someone clarify it for me?
I find Lewis-Williams’ arguments interesting but like Sarah R, a wee ethnocentric. It seems like his argument partially rests on the fact that Homo sapiens sapiens won at evolution and Neanderthals didn’t (which, to be honest, is a hard point to argue against). Homo sapiens had art, language, and the ability to experience altered states due to their superior mental abilities, which the Neanderthals didn’t have, thus they were mentally inferior and died out. I don’t think Lewis-Williams entire argument rests on the comparison between Neanderthal and H.Sapiens but he does seem to draw a lot of comparisons and I’m not exactly ready to believe that Neanderthals weren’t able to perform higher order thinking. There has been controversy surrounding flutes and ornaments associated with Neanderthal residences excavated recently and Lewis-Williams glosses over these issues (p 224) or doesn’t acknowledge them at all. I believe L-W’s arguments about altered states of consciousness and language and dreams all being prerequisites for representational art (especially 2-D representational art), but I think he needs more to explain how Neanderthal was able to produce similar objects on occasion and co-exist so long with H. sapiens without the same mental capacities. I think his ethno/androcentrism really comes across in statements such as “When there was conflict, it seems likely that it was the Homo sapiens men who killed the Neanderthal men and ravished their women. But the Homo sapiens communities were intelligent enough to realize that the offspring of such unions would be infertile and probably mentally inferior to themselves” (p 87). Becky Laughner
I just want to say first off how interesting the history of Neanderthals name is. How fitting that a man who questioned his religious beliefs would be the root of the name of the Homo species that would severely challenge the church’s doctrine on how the human race came to be. I also think a really key point of his writing is how he acknowledges the gradual and many different steps in the evolution towards modern humans. He makes such interesting points on the evolution of modern humans that I found myself getting distracted musing on his very valid points. For instance he looks at how some people who make theories on the evolution of homo sapiens and neanderthals predetermine the theories they arrive at by how they think their studies will arrive. This becomes very true as trends develop in anthropology. He makes a point to not do this and i can see that by how he acknowledges so many different possibilities and so much evidence. However, he did make some good points on the magic and such involved in early art in chapter 3. He mentions art that has contagious magic roots and how hunting and art associated with it have magical means of acquiring the strength of the animals hunted or represented in their art. A lot of these ideas really connected with some of Bataille's ideas and aligns itself also with my own theories. It makes me wonder if it is not art so much as the thought and mental capabilities necessary for creating idols or idol-like art. Like he said that art objects come before an aesthetic sense. Nonetheless, I love how he acknowledges the complexity of the issues surrounding art.
Lewis-William’s description of art as “social discrimination” is very difference than the way in which most contemporary people view art. Lewis-Williams sites Laming-Emperaire and Leroi-Gourhans’ emphasis on “the ‘beneficial’ effects of image-making by claiming that images facilitated extended inter-group co-operation, intra-group cohesion, information-exchange, the resolution of binary oppositions, and so forth” (Lewis-Williams 95) which makes perfect sense, and is similar to the way in which contemporary image-making is often viewed. In fact, for the past several thousand years image-making seems to be a way in which humans have been able to share ideas and work together, both physically and mentally. Images are a way in which people can communicate across a wide audience even complex ideas, and so can be useful universal means of communication between groups of people. However, Lewis-Williams brings up the fascinating point that “it was not ‘beauty’ or an ‘aesthetic sense’ that was burgeoning at the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic but rather social discrimination. Art and ritual may well contribute to social cohesion, but they do so by marking off groups from other groups and thus creating the potential for social tension”(Lewis-Williams 96). Lewis-Williams claims that the ability of Homo sapiens to create art and understand it set them apart from the Neanderthals, who were unable to comprehend visual art (such as cave paintings), and in this case art created ‘tension’ between two species. His point also made me try to think of other cases where art is used in order to close certain groups off from each other, intimidate people, and all sorts of other malignant intensions. I find it rather unsettling to think about art in this way, since throughout my life art has been presented to me as a unifying activity to bring people together, an idea presented to me beginning with my preschool education. I realize now that there is malignant art all around us, and from throughout history. Just to throw out some general examples, governments and politicians use images to spread propaganda to large groups of people; these images often will work to divide groups along national or political lines. Before reading Lewis-Williams’ critique of art as a social divider, I always though of it as an activity that brought people together. And art can be used in this relatively beneficial way, as well as in a divisive way. This dual nature of art is reflected in the various examples of idols we have seen in class, some of which are used to harm others (the nail fetish figures from the Congo for example) where as other idols seem to be benevolent, and others are both, depending upon the interaction of the recipient with the idol in question.
I found some aspects of Lewis-William's thesis problematic. First of all, it supposes a shamanistic religion as the ONLY explanation for the cave paintings. Although his aligning of geometric designs in the caves and the stage 1 hallucinations he describes are convincing, his alignment of the stage 2 and 3 paintings suffer from a real danger of equifinity. A swirl of paintings around a central hole can be deliberately reminiscent of a vortex, or it could simply be the result of the wider use of a larger more accessible part of a cave. The more specifically composed paintings in the smaller caves may be the result of vision quests, but they could also be the result of solitary painters with no hallucinations.
I am wary of the idea that humans could NEVER come up with the idea of drawing on their own. I don't think the stretch from reading a deer track in soft mud to doodling your own drawing in it is too far. Hallucinations could explain the visions in the cave, but I don't think the results are as air-tight as the author presents them.
I agree with Lewis-Williams that Neanderthal’s inability to create images indicates a lower mental capacity than Homo Sapiens who were able to produce images. However, if Homo Sapiens were so advanced and possessed this higher consciousness, why must image-making necessarily have emerged from hallucinations? And if image creation was the result of hallucination, why could Neanderthals not make images while in drug-induced altered-states, which would not require a higher consciousness? I think we could also look at image-making as a demonstration of the ability to think abstractly or symbolically, which to me would indicate a higher mental capacity or consciousness. Additionally, when Lewis-Morgan uses the lack of grave goods in Neanderthal burials as further evidence of the lower level of consciousness in Neanderthals, he seems to be, in a way, contradicting his own argument that image creation was the result of hallucination. He argues that Neanderthals did not really adopt elaborate burials because they were unable to imagine a spirit world or “to create an ‘alternative reality’” (93). However, Lewis-Morgan does not say that burial with grave goods was a result of hallucination but he does compare it with image-making. How then are the two different such that one must result from hallucination or an altered state and the other does not if both practices require higher consciousness and the ability to “remember and entertain mental imagery…manipulate and share that imagery” and socialize that imagery (93)?
Lewis-William's discussion, which seeks to answer the question, "Why did Upper Paleolithic people make images?" is well thought out in terms of method. His uses of the "cable" and "chain" arguments are (ideally) a useful check on the text's potentially far-reaching ideas. Yet when LW gets into his discussion of power, in both the creator and the created, the checking system falls away.
The problem of power is addressed in Chapter 8, "The Cave in the Mind". LW discusses human creation of art through an interaction of various materials: paint, hands, and rock: "[the paint] probably had its own significance and potency. Perhaps it was a kind of power-impregnated 'solvent' that 'dissolved' the rock and facilitated intimate contact with the realm behind it." (218) Here LW suggests that the paint may hold a sort of "power" (agency?) that affects the humans' interaction with the rock.
The second instance in which power of creation is addressed is in LW's discussion of darkness and light: "The creator controls the image. On the other hand, the image holds its creator in its power" (221). Here LW vests power in both the creator and the image.
Given all that we've learned from Gell, however, there is a serious flaw in LW's not fully addressing the tension/mediation between these two forms of power. Gell (and Latour) would have seriously zeroed in on this tension of the powers and tried to work through it. Admittedly, LW may have avoided addressing this because to do so is to (possibly) outstep the bounds of his "checking system". Still, I get the sense that, by letting himself structure the relationship of the creator/image in terms of power, LW has already reached some relatively presumptive, non-provable territory.
Lewis-Williams provides an excellent and comprehensive view on the development of art in the Paleolithic, using psychology, brain function, and social interactions as evidence to prove his point. He believes that dreams and shamanism are large factors in the creation of cave paintings and portable art. Caves are the spirit world, a humunculus if you will, with 'idols' inside. The entrance coincides with a spirit entrance, an eye or vulva if you will. It is not unlike the prehistoric ritual of throwing objects into the ground or water - dedications to 'the world beyond'. It is interesting to see that the creation of art was partially influenced by close proximity to Neanderthals (94). When two 'societies' collide and share the landscape, it is common for both to develop extreme displays of cultural differences (Romans and indigenous interactions are good examples). Body paint evolved into cave painting, partially from dreams and heightened states, but also from close cultural interactions. Homo sapien (consciously or subconsciously) wished to differentiate itself from Neanderthal. It would be interesting to see how art developed away from continental Europe. I'm also curious as to why art ended with the Paleolithic period; dreams and spirit journeys simply do not end, and the human mind did not devolve. Another note: Lewis-Williams makes it a point to avoid using sympathetic magic in his theories; however, the use of 3D art by shamans was in itself a form of sympathetic magic. "Spirit horses...(are) shamans' animal helpers...associating with a spear may have highlighted success and power in hunting" (201).
I found this book fascinating, but one thing that surprised me was how often Lewis-Williams dismisses the importance of the development of language to image-making. For example, he says that "There is no doubt in any researchers' minds that Upper Paleolithic people had fully modern language ... What is at issue is whether the Neanderthals also had fully modern language ... [but this] question ... need not impede our discussion" (88-89). Yet, he goes on to say that "language is closely related to social complexity" and so Neanderthals likely had a rudimentary sort of language, but that "this notion may be difficult for us to grasp because their language would have been compatible with a type of consciousness different from ours" (89). He also pairs the development of "fully modern language" with "the making of images" in his list of indications of "symbolic activity" (101). Language and imagery seem very much intertwined, both in the cognitive sense of using symbolism and showing a certain—I don’t want to say ‘complexity’ so I’ll go with ‘a certain level of social interaction’; Lewis-Williams even asks, early on, whether “art-making [is] simply a part of being human, as language appears to be, and therefore hardly in need of explanation?” (40), and links both art and language to the “higher-order consciousness” of Homo sapiens (188). Doesn’t it seem that language could play a significant role in image-making? if not as a cause or effect, at least as a parallel phenomenon linked to it both cognitively and socially?
I was really drawn to Lewis-Williams' statement that "people did not invent two-dimensional images of things in their material environment. On the contrary, a notion of images and the vocabulary of motifs were part of their experience before they made parietal or portable images." (185) -- I think my interest in this statement might lie in the fact that I am still debating whether or not I agree with Mithen's assertion that the creation of images is necessary in order to fully conceptualize abstract ideas. Lewis-Williams, on the other hand, is saying that abstract images are an inherent part of human consciousness as we know it. I am not sure that these assertions necessarily contradict each other, since Mithen is talking only about representations of supernatural beings while Lewis-Williams' discussion covers mostly the cave-paintings representing animals (a representation of an abstract idea versus a representation of something that already exists and has been seen). However I think it merits some thought -- if abstract images are essential to human consciousness, this could be seen as a reason why people develop religious ideas and express them in images. I find this more convincing than the images being created as a sort of afterthought following the initial development of the abstract idea of a supernatural being.
There is much space I could waste on my praises of Lewis-Williams’ neuropsychological and sociological approach at analyzing and understanding the world of Upper Paleolithic image-making. I loved his metaphorical comparison of the cave to a membrane, a “living veil” that when ritualistically touched and manipulated, temporarily parted, opening a portal between the spiritual, immaterial world and the profane, material reality of early Mankind. I must say, I was rather disappointed when Lewis-Williams biasedly examined Homo Neanderthalis as semi-humans with lesser forms of consciousness and cognitive abilities readily accessible. My initial reaction was negative, assuming most of the juxtaposition between early Homo Sapiens and Homo Neanderthalis in Chapter 3 was a continuation of the historic academic behavior known as Neanderthal-bashing. There is so little archaeological, let alone osteological evidence we have from Homo Neanderthalis human and material culture remains, I’d say it’s a bold and egotistical move to claim “For the Neanderthals, this kind of society [one that was socially differentiated based upon culturally-defined divisions—removed from the characteristic traits of the biological body] was – literally – unthinkable.” (Lewis-Williams 92) I would argue Lewis-Williams is falling into the same inevitable “danger of predetermining a particular kind of answer (that was in all probability in the mind from the beginning)” (Lewis Williams 73) all scientists teeter on the edge of. If Neanderthals were copying art without the symbolism or social significance connected to such a cultural practice, you really only have to devote a chapter or two to such lesser beings.
But I’ve gone on an unnecessary rant here. My real issue with Lewis-Williams lies not in his scientific methodology for handling Homo Neanderthalis, but in his utter dismissal of body decoration within this neuropsychological and socio-cultural construction of the meaning behind image-making for early man. If the cave was a “membrane” between the world of the spiritual and the material, why couldn’t our own living, breathing, and pulsating membranes become a veil between similarly conceived distinctive realms, interacting with each other through the use of contact with paint (a powerful tool to provoke and invoke the spiritual world to arise from the depths of the underworld to the visible surface of the cave walls, as Lewis-Williams so readily argued) on the skin?
Whether the insides of a person (Gell’s homunculus taken to a higher religious and spiritual level) were considered analogous to the spiritual depths of a cave, housing a whole plethora of mystical and powerful creatures, or took on some alternative meaning, I think the use of body decoration, within Lewis-Williams’ analytical structure, should be given greater study than he afforded it in The Mind in the Cave. Body decoration could be simply interpreted as the invocation of some possessing spirit within a “shaman” (or a vision quester: the elite few who traveled into the depths of Lascaux to communicate with and gain power—thus, possible physical possession—from the netherworlds). By painting and drawing on the membranes of the “shamans”—assuming the individuals being decorated held some kind of comparable position in society and its religion—the result could’ve been similar, if not an exact replica of the effect image-making produced in cave art. I was greatly dissatisfied that Lewis-Williams avoided this subject altogether.
Lewis-Williams presents us with a striking account of the emergence of different consciousnesses and their contribution to both socialization, generally increased social stratification, and image conceptualization and production. I was particularly taken by a threshold that Lewis-Williams points to, but does not fully engage with. He argues that “at a given time, and for social reasons, the projected images of altered states were insufficient and people needed to ‘fix’ their visions. They reached out to their emotionally charged visions and tried to touch them, to hold them in place, perhaps on soft surfaces and with their fingers. They were not inventing images. They were merely touching what was already there.” (193) This need for a condensed, tangible form of the image is clearly an enormous turning point. To Lewis-Williams, it is indeed, a need- not something that just came as a happy mistake. I would love to talk about this to some extent. It fits in with earlier discussion of what the idol is- the tangible, earthly manifestation of the supernatural? Interesting that we were already coming to this sort of consideration prior to reading this text… Megan Holland
I think that Lewis-Williams' positioning of the interactions of consciousnesses as underlying shamanistic imagery worldwide has a lot to offer. The model allows for cultural interpretations of a shared, human neurological framework; it takes the sort of specious argument that certain practices (representative images, etc) are “just what humans do,” or that they're innate tendencies, and offers a specific basis for the repetition of these practices. His argument that the apparently widespread underworld/earth/heaven dynamic derives from common experiences of altered consciousness is pretty alluring, for example.
Anyway, it seems like a contentious point in Lewis-Williams' argument involves the need to distinguish different types of art as not related “evolutionarily” because of a distinct difference in kind (ie, body painting and representational images). In class we have been expanding our notion of what might constitute an image beyond the two-dimensional, representational picture to bodies and objects and so on. And while conceiving of, for instance, the corpse as a reminder of the conflation of signified and signifier in life still makes sense, I also see how the pictures Lewis-Williams focuses on constitute a different sort of encounter. For one thing, the argument that a mind capable of connecting experiences across different states of consciousnesses did not emerge until the humans of the Upper Paleolithic still has applications for the corpse as image, or perhaps for other symbolism of the body like decoration. What was necessary for humans to make all these connections regarding the corpse, what did this step require of humans that animals or perhaps Neanderthals lacked? Following Lewis-Williams, it might be the ability just to recognize and remember the dream state as an instance when the spirit detaches from matter. This isn't really a conclusive application of Lewis-Williams' argument or anything, but I think (partly intuitively, at the moment) that there is a basis for distinguishing among types of images or art, and that the consciousness theory might hold in a way even when looking at these other forms.
The Neurological Model offered by Lewis-Williams in The Mind in the Cave is very different from other models and explanations we have encountered through this course. Lewis-Williams uses his model to study consciousness, something he openly admits is intrinsically difficult.
The model would effectively explain the mass expanse of art throughout the Upper Paleolithic world. However, I don't think the model explains everything perfectly and he ignores much about human nature, but it is indeed a compelling concept.
I think it is important to note the distinction Lewis-Williams makes in chapter three. We should not think of the dissimilarity between Neanderthal and man as the result of inferior intelligence, but instead a radically distinct kind of consciousness (95). The homo-sapiens emphasize their superiority in various social situations, which makes the difference visible. They would accentuate the difference by creating and proliferating images. When we think of the Neanderthal as a distinct species, with a consciousness completely foreign to our own, Lewis-Williams analysis of there neurological limitations seems less presumptuous.
Still, whenever analysis of a culture distinct from our own relies heavily on neurological and psychological explanations, I tend to feel compelled, as an anthropology major, to take issue with this. Lewis-Williams points out that his fellow archeologists struggle with this approach, or “paleopsychology” (101) as they see it. Yet after reading later chapters of the book, I think Lewis-Williams squares the neurological and the social elements of early cave- art. In a discussion of the consciousness of early human-kind, and especially the comparison to Neanderthals, it is impossible not to discuss cognitive processes which affect the social world. Homo-Sapiens exploited the difference between themselves and the Neanderthals, which helped them discover their cognitive capacities. “Social diversity” is the driving force of society (181). Lewis-Williams believed much of the imagery expressed early on was associated with hallucinations and altered states of consciousness. Also, he does not try to explain art as the manifestation of interior neurological processes. Human memory reifies the neurological experience (126).
I also think it is quite a revelation to see memory as culturally determined. It is easy to think of memory as the perfect, organic expression of mind and interior. Instead we select what we remember, and sometimes change it completely without realizing it (ex. In the case of a retelling a dream where the story changes completely and at times loses its significance). Lewis-Williams also points out that this ability to retell dreams or altered states, and socialize them (199) marks the distinction from Neanderthal.
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In Chapter 3 (A Creative Illusion), Lewis-Williams brings up a great point that a person involved in anthropological, sociological, psychological, etcetera studies has to be very wary of “the danger of predetermining a particular kind of answer (that was in all probability in mind from the beginning)” (Lewis-Williams 73). Specifically, Laming-Emperaire and Leroi-Gourhan are referenced due to the fact that their hypotheses were derived from the way they collected their data and managed it. Linearity, Lewis-Williams explains, cannot be the sole method used when observing and analyzing data. I believe it’s fair to say that this statement (in the context of Lewis-Williams’ text) was made because of how complex and unusual human behavior, evolution, and mere existence is. In science as well as the humanities, if a particular hypothesis is stated, there is some logical reasoning behind it (which is why a hypothesis is described as an “educated guess”). Therefore, it is hard to withhold bias(es) that might be in one’s mind. After all, it’s simple human nature to be opinionated and to have feelings. It is hard to detach oneself from personal beliefs and prior knowledge of a topic, but it is necessary to alter one’s perspective when looking at different people’s, especially when looking at those from the past and those of a different species.
On page 104 Lewis-Williams says “…consciousness (as distinct from brain)…” This sentence made me think of homunculi. Although Lewis-Williams (rightly, I believe) wants to address the concept of consciousness as fundamentally biological, he still implicitly uses this notion of the inner person as distinct from the biological person. When we consider Lewis-Williams’ concept of ‘consciousness’ in this way, shamanistic imagery is consciousness projecting biological images into the physical world. In other words, first the images are created neurologically while a person is experiencing an altered state. In Gellian terms, the hallucinations are the ‘prototype’. This prototype agent then affects the ‘higher order consciousness’ of the person who is experiencing the hallucination, and he or she remembers the experience and depicts it in art form. Thus we have
Neurological images (Prototype; primary agent) ->
Higher order consciousness (Artist; secondary agent) ->
Cave paintings/statuettes (Index; both types of agent)
I called the paintings both primary and secondary agents. Lewis-Williams would argue that they offer insights into the cosmology of the people who created them. He would also argue, based on the way people utilize the cave wall or the pieces of ivory, that they are ‘real’ spirits, which influence the world and cosmology of the artists. In that way, the paintings ARE agents, and there should be arrows traveling from ‘cave paintings’ back up to ‘higher order consciousness’. There should also be an arrow up to ‘Images’, since, cosmologically, ‘neurological images’ ARE the spirit world (and thus they are primary agents). Biologically, drawing visions is a self-reinforcing process as the brain would continue to create images with which it is familiar – presumably similar to those a person sees and draws on cave walls (and thus they are also secondary agents). In Gellian terms, then, the process Lewis-Williams describes continuously reinforces itself in a social web of agency between the spirit world and the human world. I suspect that the patient in this relationship is the populace as a whole. The images (as secondary agents) influence the population as patients and maintain the Shaman’s power. If we wanted to draw more arrows, we could have the population (receiver p) influencing the shamans (receiver p; by shamans I mean their physical bodies). The shamans’ physical condition could also be said to influence the neurological images, so we need a line from shaman (receiver p) to neurological images (prototype a). Anyway, I hope that makes sense. And I hope it was appropriate to bring in and older text to analyze a piece of our current one.
(Sarah E)
In the argument proposed by Lewis-WIlliams that Homo sapiens had a higher level of consciousness and therefore could practice shamanism and remember dreams and socialize with others while discussing these dreams, he also claims that Neanderthals did not have this same level of consciousness and therefore did not have the capabilities to practice shamanism or experience and altered state. This seems like a definitely plausible argument and one that accounts for the cave art, but in bringing up this argument, I can't help but wonder why the human brain would have evolved to include the capabilities of altered states of consciousness, whether these are dreams or drug-induced states. Lewis-Williams makes a strong connection between Neanderthals and other animals as far as brain functions in regards to dreams, but would Neanderthals therefore not be affected by drugs that induce altered states of consciousness? Also, what is the evolutionary advantage of being able to dream and have a higher level of consciousness? Doesn't this also lead to a lot more possible brain diseases and dysfunctions (like schizophrenia and others)?
This from Sarah Rockefeller:
I find Lewis-Williams’ neuropsychological model explaining the sudden explosion of Upper Paleolithic art to be intriguing and brave. Lewis-Williams critiques Mithen’s theory of modular domains of intelligence, claiming that the theory relies on observation of modern animal and human behavior and that we cannot study the “modularity of ancient minds” (111). By my reading Lewis-Williams does the exact same thing in his study of primary and higher-order consciousness.
He acknowledges the difficulty of studying consciousness, and while he lays out “explicit neural models” as Edelman insists one must (186), through his neuropsychological model its seems that he is unable to reconcile the existence of anatomically and behaviorally modern humans in Africa with the scarcity of image-making prior to the upper Paleolithic.
I like the hypothesis that the existence of shamanism and altered states of mind is responsible for the sudden appearance of representational images but Lewis-Williams acknowledges that the shift to behavioral modernity seems to have begun in Africa 250,000-300,000 years ago (98). I am confused how he can thus agree that there was no “revolution” and that modern behaviors developed differently in different places yet support his whole argument for the explosion of art in western Europe with a universal neuropsychological model of anatomically modern humans. If anatomically modern humans in Africa showed some modern behavioral characteristics what changed in Europe? Maybe I am missing his point but it seems that he circularly explains the explosion of image-making by stating that they had higher-level consciousness but proves their higher-level consciousness by pointing to the explosion of image-making. I think one of the greatest difficulties of taking on this study is the European bias that exists the field.
I enjoyed following Lewis-William's argument about higher and altered consciousness being the cause of the explosion of art in the Upper Paleolithic period. I was skeptical at first when he pointed to altered states of mind being the explanation of the creation of images. I thought that this kind of consciousness must happen only under very specific circumstances, and that it in no way could have led to the vast amounts of images that were created and that still are created today. I asked myself how often could these Upper Paleolithic homo sapiens be inducing hallucinations and visions?
As Lewis-Williams continued to discuss his ideas about shamanism and the evidence of interaction with the caves, however, I became convinced that he has a great deal of reason in his argument. He brings up evidence that I never would have connected to an alternate reality, such as floating bison, and handprints becoming part of the cave wall.
I think my favorite part of his argument was that this Transition was entirely biological. I find it somewhat ironic that he wishes to take a biological approach to the world of spirits and religion which are in a way the opposite of biology.
Lewis-Williams’ argument about hallucination and shamans gave me a new point of view to understand cave art. His hypothesis is quite plausible in that the images in the cave might come with the ability to project the evanescent images onto the walls. He assumes that not all people possess such abilities, so only shamans might be allowed to go into the cave and perform socially discriminating activities.
However, is the image-making related only to the hallucination? I agree with Sarah in that hallucination may not be a proof of evolution in consciousness, but I assume that image-making may not require the hallucination itself. In his argument, image-making is the production of Homo sapiens, not of Neanderthals. If the consciousness of Homo sapiens is developed enough to draw an image, why is hallucination needed to make such images? We know that even toddlers can draw pictures of animals, and do they draw them in the phase of hallucination or after waking up from a dream? I think Homo sapiens might make the images just to mimic the shapes of what they saw, like babies do. Therefore, there might not be any social discrimination in image-making among Homo sapiens because all of them had the ability to make one.
However, Neanderthals are different. They did not possess the same level of consciousness as Homo sapiens, thus only some special people, such as shamans, could be involved in image-making. Isn’t there any possibility that such a shaman was someone from Homo sapiens who was neighbor of Neanderthals?
I find this book to be very interesting, but I seem to have a couple of issues with some of the points brought up by Lewis-Williams. There could be a chance I misunderstood the point he was trying to make, but it seemed like to me that he was saying that one of the main reasons Neanderthals weren't able to survive was the fact that they didn't create any sort of images. He states that, "Neanderthals were unable to remember and entertain mental imagery...manipulate and share that imagery...recognize a connection between mental images and two- and three dimensional images" (93). He believes that to be able to construct images, one needs to have an advanced brain; in regards to the Neanderthals they didn't have this. He says that with their mental capacity they were only able to construct tools that possible reflected their social status. Lewis-Williams does bring up interesting points, but from what I remember learning about Neanderthals, one of the main reasons they became extinct was the fact they were out competed by other Homo sapiens (Cro-Mongons). Furthermore, he makes it sound like the only thing Neanderthals knew what to do is make tools and that they had no language. Even though Neanderthals had a somewhat smaller cranial capacity to that of Homo sapiens, couldn't it be possible they had some sort of language that wasn't spoken. I may be getting carried away here, but maybe could someone clarify it for me?
I find Lewis-Williams’ arguments interesting but like Sarah R, a wee ethnocentric. It seems like his argument partially rests on the fact that Homo sapiens sapiens won at evolution and Neanderthals didn’t (which, to be honest, is a hard point to argue against). Homo sapiens had art, language, and the ability to experience altered states due to their superior mental abilities, which the Neanderthals didn’t have, thus they were mentally inferior and died out. I don’t think Lewis-Williams entire argument rests on the comparison between Neanderthal and H.Sapiens but he does seem to draw a lot of comparisons and I’m not exactly ready to believe that Neanderthals weren’t able to perform higher order thinking. There has been controversy surrounding flutes and ornaments associated with Neanderthal residences excavated recently and Lewis-Williams glosses over these issues (p 224) or doesn’t acknowledge them at all. I believe L-W’s arguments about altered states of consciousness and language and dreams all being prerequisites for representational art (especially 2-D representational art), but I think he needs more to explain how Neanderthal was able to produce similar objects on occasion and co-exist so long with H. sapiens without the same mental capacities. I think his ethno/androcentrism really comes across in statements such as “When there was conflict, it seems likely that it was the Homo sapiens men who killed the Neanderthal men and ravished their women. But the Homo sapiens communities were intelligent enough to realize that the offspring of such unions would be infertile and probably mentally inferior to themselves” (p 87).
Becky Laughner
I just want to say first off how interesting the history of Neanderthals name is. How fitting that a man who questioned his religious beliefs would be the root of the name of the Homo species that would severely challenge the church’s doctrine on how the human race came to be. I also think a really key point of his writing is how he acknowledges the gradual and many different steps in the evolution towards modern humans. He makes such interesting points on the evolution of modern humans that I found myself getting distracted musing on his very valid points. For instance he looks at how some people who make theories on the evolution of homo sapiens and neanderthals predetermine the theories they arrive at by how they think their studies will arrive. This becomes very true as trends develop in anthropology. He makes a point to not do this and i can see that by how he acknowledges so many different possibilities and so much evidence. However, he did make some good points on the magic and such involved in early art in chapter 3. He mentions art that has contagious magic roots and how hunting and art associated with it have magical means of acquiring the strength of the animals hunted or represented in their art. A lot of these ideas really connected with some of Bataille's ideas and aligns itself also with my own theories. It makes me wonder if it is not art so much as the thought and mental capabilities necessary for creating idols or idol-like art. Like he said that art objects come before an aesthetic sense. Nonetheless, I love how he acknowledges the complexity of the issues surrounding art.
Lewis-William’s description of art as “social discrimination” is very difference than the way in which most contemporary people view art. Lewis-Williams sites Laming-Emperaire and Leroi-Gourhans’ emphasis on “the ‘beneficial’ effects of image-making by claiming that images facilitated extended inter-group co-operation, intra-group cohesion, information-exchange, the resolution of binary oppositions, and so forth” (Lewis-Williams 95) which makes perfect sense, and is similar to the way in which contemporary image-making is often viewed. In fact, for the past several thousand years image-making seems to be a way in which humans have been able to share ideas and work together, both physically and mentally. Images are a way in which people can communicate across a wide audience even complex ideas, and so can be useful universal means of communication between groups of people.
However, Lewis-Williams brings up the fascinating point that “it was not ‘beauty’ or an ‘aesthetic sense’ that was burgeoning at the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic but rather social discrimination. Art and ritual may well contribute to social cohesion, but they do so by marking off groups from other groups and thus creating the potential for social tension”(Lewis-Williams 96). Lewis-Williams claims that the ability of Homo sapiens to create art and understand it set them apart from the Neanderthals, who were unable to comprehend visual art (such as cave paintings), and in this case art created ‘tension’ between two species. His point also made me try to think of other cases where art is used in order to close certain groups off from each other, intimidate people, and all sorts of other malignant intensions. I find it rather unsettling to think about art in this way, since throughout my life art has been presented to me as a unifying activity to bring people together, an idea presented to me beginning with my preschool education. I realize now that there is malignant art all around us, and from throughout history. Just to throw out some general examples, governments and politicians use images to spread propaganda to large groups of people; these images often will work to divide groups along national or political lines. Before reading Lewis-Williams’ critique of art as a social divider, I always though of it as an activity that brought people together. And art can be used in this relatively beneficial way, as well as in a divisive way. This dual nature of art is reflected in the various examples of idols we have seen in class, some of which are used to harm others (the nail fetish figures from the Congo for example) where as other idols seem to be benevolent, and others are both, depending upon the interaction of the recipient with the idol in question.
I found some aspects of Lewis-William's thesis problematic. First of all, it supposes a shamanistic religion as the ONLY explanation for the cave paintings. Although his aligning of geometric designs in the caves and the stage 1 hallucinations he describes are convincing, his alignment of the stage 2 and 3 paintings suffer from a real danger of equifinity. A swirl of paintings around a central hole can be deliberately reminiscent of a vortex, or it could simply be the result of the wider use of a larger more accessible part of a cave. The more specifically composed paintings in the smaller caves may be the result of vision quests, but they could also be the result of solitary painters with no hallucinations.
I am wary of the idea that humans could NEVER come up with the idea of drawing on their own. I don't think the stretch from reading a deer track in soft mud to doodling your own drawing in it is too far. Hallucinations could explain the visions in the cave, but I don't think the results are as air-tight as the author presents them.
I agree with Lewis-Williams that Neanderthal’s inability to create images indicates a lower mental capacity than Homo Sapiens who were able to produce images. However, if Homo Sapiens were so advanced and possessed this higher consciousness, why must image-making necessarily have emerged from hallucinations? And if image creation was the result of hallucination, why could Neanderthals not make images while in drug-induced altered-states, which would not require a higher consciousness? I think we could also look at image-making as a demonstration of the ability to think abstractly or symbolically, which to me would indicate a higher mental capacity or consciousness.
Additionally, when Lewis-Morgan uses the lack of grave goods in Neanderthal burials as further evidence of the lower level of consciousness in Neanderthals, he seems to be, in a way, contradicting his own argument that image creation was the result of hallucination. He argues that Neanderthals did not really adopt elaborate burials because they were unable to imagine a spirit world or “to create an ‘alternative reality’” (93). However, Lewis-Morgan does not say that burial with grave goods was a result of hallucination but he does compare it with image-making. How then are the two different such that one must result from hallucination or an altered state and the other does not if both practices require higher consciousness and the ability to “remember and entertain mental imagery…manipulate and share that imagery” and socialize that imagery (93)?
Lewis-William's discussion, which seeks to answer the question, "Why did Upper Paleolithic people make images?" is well thought out in terms of method. His uses of the "cable" and "chain" arguments are (ideally) a useful check on the text's potentially far-reaching ideas. Yet when LW gets into his discussion of power, in both the creator and the created, the checking system falls away.
The problem of power is addressed in Chapter 8, "The Cave in the Mind". LW discusses human creation of art through an interaction of various materials: paint, hands, and rock: "[the paint] probably had its own significance and potency. Perhaps it was a kind of power-impregnated 'solvent' that 'dissolved' the rock and facilitated intimate contact with the realm behind it." (218) Here LW suggests that the paint may hold a sort of "power" (agency?) that affects the humans' interaction with the rock.
The second instance in which power of creation is addressed is in LW's discussion of darkness and light: "The creator controls the image. On the other hand, the image holds its creator in its power" (221). Here LW vests power in both the creator and the image.
Given all that we've learned from Gell, however, there is a serious flaw in LW's not fully addressing the tension/mediation between these two forms of power. Gell (and Latour) would have seriously zeroed in on this tension of the powers and tried to work through it. Admittedly, LW may have avoided addressing this because to do so is to (possibly) outstep the bounds of his "checking system". Still, I get the sense that, by letting himself structure the relationship of the creator/image in terms of power, LW has already reached some relatively presumptive, non-provable territory.
Lewis-Williams provides an excellent and comprehensive view on the development of art in the Paleolithic, using psychology, brain function, and social interactions as evidence to prove his point. He believes that dreams and shamanism are large factors in the creation of cave paintings and portable art. Caves are the spirit world, a humunculus if you will, with 'idols' inside. The entrance coincides with a spirit entrance, an eye or vulva if you will. It is not unlike the prehistoric ritual of throwing objects into the ground or water - dedications to 'the world beyond'. It is interesting to see that the creation of art was partially influenced by close proximity to Neanderthals (94). When two 'societies' collide and share the landscape, it is common for both to develop extreme displays of cultural differences (Romans and indigenous interactions are good examples). Body paint evolved into cave painting, partially from dreams and heightened states, but also from close cultural interactions. Homo sapien (consciously or subconsciously) wished to differentiate itself from Neanderthal. It would be interesting to see how art developed away from continental Europe. I'm also curious as to why art ended with the Paleolithic period; dreams and spirit journeys simply do not end, and the human mind did not devolve. Another note: Lewis-Williams makes it a point to avoid using sympathetic magic in his theories; however, the use of 3D art by shamans was in itself a form of sympathetic magic. "Spirit horses...(are) shamans' animal helpers...associating with a spear may have highlighted success and power in hunting" (201).
I found this book fascinating, but one thing that surprised me was how often Lewis-Williams dismisses the importance of the development of language to image-making. For example, he says that "There is no doubt in any researchers' minds that Upper Paleolithic people had fully modern language ... What is at issue is whether the Neanderthals also had fully modern language ... [but this] question ... need not impede our discussion" (88-89). Yet, he goes on to say that "language is closely related to social complexity" and so Neanderthals likely had a rudimentary sort of language, but that "this notion may be difficult for us to grasp because their language would have been compatible with a type of consciousness different from ours" (89). He also pairs the development of "fully modern language" with "the making of images" in his list of indications of "symbolic activity" (101). Language and imagery seem very much intertwined, both in the cognitive sense of using symbolism and showing a certain—I don’t want to say ‘complexity’ so I’ll go with ‘a certain level of social interaction’; Lewis-Williams even asks, early on, whether “art-making [is] simply a part of being human, as language appears to be, and therefore hardly in need of explanation?” (40), and links both art and language to the “higher-order consciousness” of Homo sapiens (188). Doesn’t it seem that language could play a significant role in image-making? if not as a cause or effect, at least as a parallel phenomenon linked to it both cognitively and socially?
I was really drawn to Lewis-Williams' statement that "people did not invent two-dimensional images of things in their material environment. On the contrary, a notion of images and the vocabulary of motifs were part of their experience before they made parietal or portable images." (185) -- I think my interest in this statement might lie in the fact that I am still debating whether or not I agree with Mithen's assertion that the creation of images is necessary in order to fully conceptualize abstract ideas. Lewis-Williams, on the other hand, is saying that abstract images are an inherent part of human consciousness as we know it. I am not sure that these assertions necessarily contradict each other, since Mithen is talking only about representations of supernatural beings while Lewis-Williams' discussion covers mostly the cave-paintings representing animals (a representation of an abstract idea versus a representation of something that already exists and has been seen). However I think it merits some thought -- if abstract images are essential to human consciousness, this could be seen as a reason why people develop religious ideas and express them in images. I find this more convincing than the images being created as a sort of afterthought following the initial development of the abstract idea of a supernatural being.
There is much space I could waste on my praises of Lewis-Williams’ neuropsychological and sociological approach at analyzing and understanding the world of Upper Paleolithic image-making. I loved his metaphorical comparison of the cave to a membrane, a “living veil” that when ritualistically touched and manipulated, temporarily parted, opening a portal between the spiritual, immaterial world and the profane, material reality of early Mankind. I must say, I was rather disappointed when Lewis-Williams biasedly examined Homo Neanderthalis as semi-humans with lesser forms of consciousness and cognitive abilities readily accessible. My initial reaction was negative, assuming most of the juxtaposition between early Homo Sapiens and Homo Neanderthalis in Chapter 3 was a continuation of the historic academic behavior known as Neanderthal-bashing. There is so little archaeological, let alone osteological evidence we have from Homo Neanderthalis human and material culture remains, I’d say it’s a bold and egotistical move to claim “For the Neanderthals, this kind of society [one that was socially differentiated based upon culturally-defined divisions—removed from the characteristic traits of the biological body] was – literally – unthinkable.” (Lewis-Williams 92) I would argue Lewis-Williams is falling into the same inevitable “danger of predetermining a particular kind of answer (that was in all probability in the mind from the beginning)” (Lewis Williams 73) all scientists teeter on the edge of. If Neanderthals were copying art without the symbolism or social significance connected to such a cultural practice, you really only have to devote a chapter or two to such lesser beings.
But I’ve gone on an unnecessary rant here. My real issue with Lewis-Williams lies not in his scientific methodology for handling Homo Neanderthalis, but in his utter dismissal of body decoration within this neuropsychological and socio-cultural construction of the meaning behind image-making for early man. If the cave was a “membrane” between the world of the spiritual and the material, why couldn’t our own living, breathing, and pulsating membranes become a veil between similarly conceived distinctive realms, interacting with each other through the use of contact with paint (a powerful tool to provoke and invoke the spiritual world to arise from the depths of the underworld to the visible surface of the cave walls, as Lewis-Williams so readily argued) on the skin?
Whether the insides of a person (Gell’s homunculus taken to a higher religious and spiritual level) were considered analogous to the spiritual depths of a cave, housing a whole plethora of mystical and powerful creatures, or took on some alternative meaning, I think the use of body decoration, within Lewis-Williams’ analytical structure, should be given greater study than he afforded it in The Mind in the Cave. Body decoration could be simply interpreted as the invocation of some possessing spirit within a “shaman” (or a vision quester: the elite few who traveled into the depths of Lascaux to communicate with and gain power—thus, possible physical possession—from the netherworlds). By painting and drawing on the membranes of the “shamans”—assuming the individuals being decorated held some kind of comparable position in society and its religion—the result could’ve been similar, if not an exact replica of the effect image-making produced in cave art. I was greatly dissatisfied that Lewis-Williams avoided this subject altogether.
Lewis-Williams presents us with a striking account of the emergence of different consciousnesses and their contribution to both socialization, generally increased social stratification, and image conceptualization and production.
I was particularly taken by a threshold that Lewis-Williams points to, but does not fully engage with. He argues that “at a given time, and for social reasons, the projected images of altered states were insufficient and people needed to ‘fix’ their visions. They reached out to their emotionally charged visions and tried to touch them, to hold them in place, perhaps on soft surfaces and with their fingers. They were not inventing images. They were merely touching what was already there.” (193) This need for a condensed, tangible form of the image is clearly an enormous turning point. To Lewis-Williams, it is indeed, a need- not something that just came as a happy mistake. I would love to talk about this to some extent. It fits in with earlier discussion of what the idol is- the tangible, earthly manifestation of the supernatural? Interesting that we were already coming to this sort of consideration prior to reading this text…
Megan Holland
I think that Lewis-Williams' positioning of the interactions of consciousnesses as underlying shamanistic imagery worldwide has a lot to offer. The model allows for cultural interpretations of a shared, human neurological framework; it takes the sort of specious argument that certain practices (representative images, etc) are “just what humans do,” or that they're innate tendencies, and offers a specific basis for the repetition of these practices. His argument that the apparently widespread underworld/earth/heaven dynamic derives from common experiences of altered consciousness is pretty alluring, for example.
Anyway, it seems like a contentious point in Lewis-Williams' argument involves the need to distinguish different types of art as not related “evolutionarily” because of a distinct difference in kind (ie, body painting and representational images). In class we have been expanding our notion of what might constitute an image beyond the two-dimensional, representational picture to bodies and objects and so on. And while conceiving of, for instance, the corpse as a reminder of the conflation of signified and signifier in life still makes sense, I also see how the pictures Lewis-Williams focuses on constitute a different sort of encounter. For one thing, the argument that a mind capable of connecting experiences across different states of consciousnesses did not emerge until the humans of the Upper Paleolithic still has applications for the corpse as image, or perhaps for other symbolism of the body like decoration. What was necessary for humans to make all these connections regarding the corpse, what did this step require of humans that animals or perhaps Neanderthals lacked? Following Lewis-Williams, it might be the ability just to recognize and remember the dream state as an instance when the spirit detaches from matter. This isn't really a conclusive application of Lewis-Williams' argument or anything, but I think (partly intuitively, at the moment) that there is a basis for distinguishing among types of images or art, and that the consciousness theory might hold in a way even when looking at these other forms.
The Neurological Model offered by Lewis-Williams in The Mind in the Cave is very different from other models and explanations we have encountered through this course. Lewis-Williams uses his model to study consciousness, something he openly admits is intrinsically difficult.
The model would effectively explain the mass expanse of art throughout the Upper Paleolithic world. However, I don't think the model explains everything perfectly and he ignores much about human nature, but it is indeed a compelling concept.
In response to Cathy:
I think it is important to note the distinction Lewis-Williams makes in chapter three.
We should not think of the dissimilarity between Neanderthal and man as the result of inferior intelligence, but instead a radically distinct kind of consciousness (95).
The homo-sapiens emphasize their superiority in various social situations, which makes the difference visible. They would accentuate the difference by creating and proliferating images. When we think of the Neanderthal as a distinct species, with a consciousness completely foreign to our own, Lewis-Williams analysis of there neurological limitations seems less presumptuous.
Still, whenever analysis of a culture distinct from our own relies heavily on neurological and psychological explanations, I tend to feel compelled, as an anthropology major, to take issue with this. Lewis-Williams points out that his fellow archeologists struggle with this approach, or “paleopsychology” (101) as they see it. Yet after reading later chapters of the book, I think Lewis-Williams squares the neurological and the social elements of early cave- art. In a discussion of the consciousness of early human-kind, and especially the comparison to Neanderthals, it is impossible not to discuss cognitive processes which affect the social world.
Homo-Sapiens exploited the difference between themselves and the Neanderthals, which helped them discover their cognitive capacities. “Social diversity” is the driving force of society (181). Lewis-Williams believed much of the imagery expressed early on was associated with hallucinations and altered states of consciousness. Also, he does not try to explain art as the manifestation of interior neurological processes. Human memory reifies the neurological experience (126).
I also think it is quite a revelation to see memory as culturally determined. It is easy to think of memory as the perfect, organic expression of mind and interior. Instead we select what we remember, and sometimes change it completely without realizing it (ex. In the case of a retelling a dream where the story changes completely and at times loses its significance). Lewis-Williams also points out that this ability to retell dreams or altered states, and socialize them (199) marks the distinction from Neanderthal.
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